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We propose an alternative test for adverse selection using notarial records for slaves sold in New Orleans
in 1830. The experiment is simple and mimics the used car example originally proposed by Akerlof
(1970). When rst sold in New Orleans, buyers of imported slaves were uninformed of the slaves'
unobservable characteristics. In time, the new owners learned more about their slaves and the \lemons"
were sold and the \peaches" retained. Because buyers anticipate that the slaves oered for sale were
of lower quality on average, they reduce their bids for these slaves. Consequently, we should observe
a lower price for the slaves who were resold in the market. We test this proposition by linking the
sequential sales records of 833 slaves sold in New Orleans. Through a comparison of initial and resale
prices, we nd that prices increased which suggests that adverse selection had a relatively small eect
on the prices of slaves.
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We propose an alternative test for adverse selection using notarial records for slaves sold in 
New Orleans in 1830.  The experiment is simple and mimics the used car example originally 
proposed by Akerlof (1970).  When first sold in New Orleans, buyers of imported slaves were 
uninformed of the slaves’ unobservable characteristics.  In time, the new owners learned more 
about their slaves and the “lemons” were sold and the “peaches” retained.  Because buyers 
anticipate that the slaves offered for sale were of lower quality on average, they reduce their 
bids for these slaves.  Consequently, we should observe a lower price for the slaves who were 
resold in the market.  We test this proposition by linking the sequential sales records of 833 
slaves sold in New Orleans.  Through a comparison of initial and resale prices, we find that prices 
increased which suggests that adverse selection had a relatively small effect on the prices of 
slaves.   
 
 





* Department of Economics, Tulane University.  The authors acknowledge the support of the National 
Science Foundation award SMA 1004569.  This paper was prepared for presentation at the meetings of 
the Cliometrics Society, January 7, 2011. 1 
 
  The value of a slave to his owner depended on unobservable traits such as skill, demeanor, or 
work ethic.  These hidden characteristics only reveal themselves with time and interaction between the 
owner and the slave.  Because sellers were better informed than potential buyers of the unobservable 
characteristics of their slaves, sellers may have adversely selected lower quality slaves for sale. If buyers 
anticipated that the slaves on the market were of lower quality, they would have shaved their bids for 
them.  Consequently, the presence of adverse selection would have lowered the prices of slaves sold in 
markets when compared to the prices of slaves chosen randomly from the enslaved population.  
  Adverse selection, if it played a large role in the market, would affect the accuracy of previous 
studies on the rate of return to slavery. In its simplest form, the rate of return is approximated by the 
quotient of the annual rental rate and the market price of slaves (see, for example, Evans, 1962).  If the 
slaves offered for sale were adversely selected whereas those offered for rent were not, then the 
calculated rate of return to slavery has been biased and overestimated.  Previous research finds that 
slave owners earned the market rate of return on their investment in slaves (Conrad and Meyer, 1958; 
Evans, 1962; Fogel and Engerman, 1974).  Consequently, the presence of adverse selection suggests that 
slave owners earned a below market rate of return on their investment, indicating that they were not 
profit maximizers at the margin or had alternative reasons for owning a slave. 
  Furthermore, adverse selection may have reduced the efficiency of the interregional slave 
market.  If buyers had anticipated that traders were selling lower quality slaves, they would have been 
reluctant to purchase them. As an impediment to the efficient transfer of enslaved labor from regions of 
lower productivity to those with higher productivity, adverse selection would have hindered southern 
economic growth. Inefficiency, however, can also promote social welfare.  Owners, for example, may 
have preferred to move labor in entire plantations rather than deal with interregional slave traders.  
Consequently, if adverse selection reduced the probability that slaves were bought and sold, it also 
improved social welfare by increasing the stability of slave families.  2 
 
  The extent of adverse selection may also reveal something about the creation of economic, 
political, and legal institutions to counteract it.  The economic institutions are evident in the nature of 
the transactions themselves. For example, if adverse selection prevailed in the market, buyers may have 
relied on the business reputation of traders to avoid the purchase of lower quality slaves.  In addition, 
buyers could seek additional market information through the hire of buying agents.  Furthermore, 
conditional or trial purchases provided buyers the opportunity to return a slave within a certain period 
of time.  Legal institutions also protected buyers through implied warranties and a court system which 
enforced contract law. As discussed later, an 1829 Louisiana law required the certification of the slave’s 
good moral character as an attempt to prevent the importation of criminal slaves into the state 
(Freudenberger and Pritchett, 1991). Therefore, buyers may have been wary of a seller’s ability to 
adversely select lower quality or even criminal slaves for sale.  Finally, the political system demonstrated 
the endogenous character of slave law – many legislators owned slaves and enacted laws to protect 
themselves and their investments in slavery (Fede, 1987). 
  The empirical evidence of adverse selection in the market for slaves is somewhat mixed.  
Greenwald and Glasspiegel (1983) test for adverse selection in the New Orleans slave market by 
comparing the prices of slaves originating from different regions of the South.  They argue that slaves 
originating from low productivity areas were more likely to be sold and less likely to be adversely 
selected than slaves from the local area.  Buyers in New Orleans offered higher prices for imported 
slaves, because they anticipated that these slaves were of higher quality than local slaves.   
Pritchett and Chamberlain (1993) test for adverse selection in the New Orleans slave market by 
comparing the prices of slaves sold at estate sales with those of slaves sold voluntarily. They argue that 
slaves sold voluntary may have been culled from the seller’s holdings whereas slaves sold at estate sales 
were less subject to adverse selection.  They find no significant difference between the prices of these 
slaves from which they conclude that adverse selection was limited. More recently, Dionne, St Amour, 3 
 
and Vencatachellum (2009) find that slaves sold at estate sales in Mauritius commanded a significant 45 
percent premium when compared to the prices of slaves sold voluntarily.  The authors argue that the 
presence of informed buyers at public estate sales bid up slave prices whereas their absence signaled to 
other buyers that the slaves were of lower quality resulting in lower bids for them. 
  The dissemination of private information to uninformed buyers, as proposed by Dionne, St 
Amour, and Vencatachellum (2009), did not apply to participants in the New Orleans market.  Contrary 
to the slave market in Mauritius, many New Orleans slaves were sold privately rather than at public 
auction.  Traders in particular maintained jails or pens in the city in order to market their slaves (in an 
analogous fashion to today’s car dealers).  Because other bidders were not present during these private 
negotiations, they were not privy to private information indicated by the presence or absence of an 
informed buyer.  In addition, informed buyers in Mauritius paid a penalty in the form of higher prices for 
their slaves, creating a strong incentive for them to conceal their participation in the market.  Dionne, 
St Amour, and Vencatachellum (2009; p. 1285) imply that the employment of buying agents was illegal 
in Mauritius whereas buying agents were frequently used in New Orleans.
1  Perhaps institutional 
differences between New Orleans and Mauritius accounts for the different empirical estimates of 
adverse selection, as estimated by Pritchett and Chamberlain (1993) and Dionne, St Amour, and 
Vencatachellum (2009). 
  We propose an alternative test for adverse selection using notarial records for slaves sold in 
New Orleans in 1830.  The experiment is simple and mimics the used car example originally proposed by 
Akerlof (1970).  When first sold in New Orleans, buyers of imported slaves were uninformed of the 
                                                            
1 As indicated by the following newspaper advertisement, some traders resented the employment of buying agents 
and encouraged planters to visit their pens without them.  “Persons desirous of purchasing would do well to call 
and examine for themselves without being accompanied with a broker, unless they themselves feel disposed to 
pay the Brokerage, as they can always purchase a Slave for TWENTY FIVE DOLLARS less without a Broker, than with 
one.  And as far as regards the subscriber, he, (believing himself capable of transacting his own business) is 
determined, from this day forward, not to pay any broker a commission on Sale of SLAVES, unless specially 
employed by him to make such sale”(New Orleans Daily Picayune, May 27, 1838, p. 3).   4 
 
slaves’ unobservable characteristics.  In time, the new owners learned more about their slaves and the 
“lemons” were sold and the “peaches” retained.  Because buyers anticipate that the slaves offered for 
sale were of lower quality on average, they reduce their bids for these slaves.  Consequently, we should 
observe a lower price for the slaves who were resold in the market.  We test this proposition by linking 
the sequential sales records of 833 slaves sold in New Orleans.  Through a comparison of initial and 
resale prices, we find that prices increased which suggest that adverse selection had a relatively small 
effect on the prices of slaves.   
Notarial Sales Records  
  We derive our sample of sales records from the New Orleans Notarial Archives, a data source 
used by previous researchers, especially Fogel and Engerman (1976), to analyze the New Orleans slave 
market.  Unlike the Fogel and Engerman sample for the years 1804 through 1862, we concentrate our 
efforts on the collection of all extant sales records for a single year   the 1830 calendar year. We believe 
that these data complement the earlier Fogel and Engerman sample by providing a census of all market 
participants including buyers, sellers, and slaves.  In addition, when compared with Fogel and 
Engerman’s earlier work, we benefit from technological changes which lowered our collection costs.  
Not only are we able to collect more information on each transaction (especially the names of the 
buyers and sellers by which we link the sales records), but we also have better information because of 
an unusual Louisiana law in effect during 1830. 
  The fear of slave insurrections led the Louisiana legislature to pass a law which required a so 
called certificate of good moral character for each out of state slave. This peculiar Louisiana law was in 
effect from April 1, 1829 through March 24, 1831. As described in the legislative acts of 1829, the 
certificate was to be signed by two or more freeholders (other than the vendor) from the county of 
origin.  The freeholders were to declare under oath that they had known the slave for several years and 
that the said slave was not guilty of any crimes, "but that he or she has a good moral character and is 5 
 
not in the habit of running away" (Louisiana, 1829: p. 38). The certificate was deposited with the notary 
when the imported slave was first sold in New Orleans.
2  In addition to the required sworn affidavit for 
imported slaves, the 1829 law required that sellers of local slaves provide some evidence that the slave 
had previously resided in the state.  Typically, the notary recorded information on the slave’s prior sale 
within the state, including the names of the previous notary, seller, and date. In the following, we use 
this information to search the title of these Louisiana slaves.   
  In order to facilitate the matching of sequential sales records,  our sample includes the records 
of all New Orleans slave sales for 1830.  Title transfers which did not represent market transactions were 
omitted from the sample.  For example, we did not collect information on the release of mortgages on 
slaves, uncompensated manumissions, or marriage contracts involving slaves as property.
3  In addition, 
we did not collect information on the sales of entire plantations, the sales of partial ownership of slaves, 
and rental agreements for plantations and slaves.
4  In most of these notarial acts, the slaves were 
located outside of New Orleans and the records fail to list their names and ages, thus limiting their use 
for the purposes of this project.  Office fires destroyed the records of two of the fourteen New Orleans 
notaries, and as a consequence, their records are not included in our sample.  In summary, our initial 
sample of invoices includes the records of 6226 slaves sold in New Orleans.
5   
  Records which do not represent market transactions are excluded from the sample.  Some sales, 
for example were annulled or voided prior to their completion – as indicated by margin notes on the 
                                                            
2 The motivation of the law was to prevent the importation of “criminal” slaves, which in and of itself, would seem 
to indicate that Louisiana buyers were wary of adverse selection in the market. Under certain circumstances, the 
law did not require the presence of a certificate. For example, certificates were not required for children aged 
twelve years or less. Also, sellers could waive the requirement if the slave had been previously sold within the 
state, or had been imported prior to April 1, 1829.  See Freudenberger and Pritchett, 1991. 
3 For examples of the release of mortgages, see Christy, v. 5, p. 508, 509. For an example of a manumission, see 
Pollock, v. 33, 482.  For a marriage contract involving the disposition of slaves, see Pollock, v. 32, p. 289. 
4 For examples of sales of entire plantations, including slaves, see Pollock, v. 32, p. 117, 179; Pollock, v. 33, p. 83; 
Christy, v. 5, p. 447.   For sales of partial ownership of slaves, see Pollock, v. 32, p. 270; Pollock v. 33, p. 83; Christy, 
v. 5, p. 447.  For the rental agreement for an entire plantation and slaves, see Pollock, v. 33, p. 144. 
5 In comparison, our sample is slightly larger than the Fogel and Engerman (1976) sample, which includes the 
records of 5009 “principal” slaves. 6 
 
sales records and the absence of the required signatures at the bottom of the invoice.  Typically, the 
voiding of a sale occurred when one of the parties to the transaction failed to meet the initially agreed 
on stipulations or because of changing circumstances between the time of sale and the recording of the 
deed.  For instance, according to one record, a "boy got drunk and the purchaser refused to take him" 
(Boswell, vol. 11, p. 528).  In order to meet the letter of the law, owners who imported slaves from 
outside Louisiana were required to provide certificates of good character even if they did not intend to 
sell them.  Some of these certificates were deposited with public notaries.  Because such deposits did 
not represent market transactions, these records were excluded from our sample.   After removing the 
records of voids, annuls, rental agreements, and deposits, we have 6174 observations in the working 
sample.   
  We identify the import status of a slave by the presence of a certificate interleaved with the 
sales invoice in the notarial records.  We classify 3078 slaves as imported from outside of the state of 
Louisiana – their records comprise 49.9 percent of our sample.  Local slaves are identified by evidence of 
prior residence within the state.  This definition is relatively inclusive because an imported slave, if 
subsequently resold, would be reclassified as a local slave.  Using information on prior residence, we 
infer that the records of 2710 local slaves are included in our sample.
6  However, we could not infer the 
origin of 386 slaves, or 6.2 percent of the sample.  We could not account for the region of origin for a 
number of reasons.  Some sellers simply state that they had owned their slaves for a number of years 
without indicating their length of residence within the state.  Also, the law of 1829 did not require a 
proof of origin for slaves aged less than 13 years.  Because the Louisiana Black Code required young 
children to be sold with their living mothers, we are able to infer their regions of origins from those of 
                                                            
6 Many local slaves had been previously sold in New Orleans.  Of the 2710 local slaves, we know the previous 
purchase date for 2407 of them (or 89% of the locals).  Instead of reporting the prior sale date, the owners of 182 
slaves declared that their slaves were imported prior to April 1, 1829, the effective enforcement date for the 
Louisiana law.  Finally, the length of residence of 118 local slaves (most of whom were children) was not recorded 
or could not be inferred by the authors.   7 
 
their mothers (Louisiana, 1806).  For most of the children aged 10 to 12 years, however, the region of 
origin cannot be determined.  These children represent a large proportion of the slaves with missing 
information. Children of these ages comprise only 7.5 percent of our sample yet account for 46 percent 
of the slaves with missing information for their regions of origin. 
Sequential Sales 
  Some local slaves were sold quite frequently whereas others had not been sold in years.  For 
those invoices which list the previous purchase date, the average number of days since the previous sale 
was 446 days, the median was 84 days, and the mode was 1 day.  The frequency of resale for local slaves 
is illustrated in figure 1.  For the 2710 local slaves sold in 1830, we find that 1470 slaves had been 
previously sold during the past 8 months.   These repeat sales represent 54 percent of the locals and 24 
percent of the slaves in our working sample.  The rapid turnover of the ownership of these slaves has a 
number of implications for previous research. Because some slaves were sold more than once, estimates 
of the total number of sales will overestimate the total number of slaves actually sold in the market.
7  In 
addition, Fogel and Engerman (1974, p. 53) estimate that only 25 percent of the slaves sold in New 
Orleans originated from the exporting areas of the South.  Because, as we will show, many local slaves 
were recently imported from outside of Louisiana, Fogel and Engerman have underestimated the 
relative importance of the interregional slave trade. 
  We construct our sample of sequential sales by matching the records of previously sold slaves to 
their subsequent sales records.  The invoices of 2407 slaves indicate the date of previous sale within the 
state of Louisiana.  Of these local slaves, 1244 were previously sold during the calendar year 1830, and 
consequently this number represents the maximum number of possible matches within our sample.   
Because of data limitations, however, we are not able to match all of these records.  Office fires 
destroyed the records of two notaries, eliminating 131 possible matches.  Missing information for the 
                                                            
7 For time period 1804 to 1862, Kotlikoff (1979, p. 497) estimates that “more than 135,000 slaves were sold in New 
Orleans.”  8 
 
names of previous notaries rules out an additional 19 matches.  Four previous sales were witnessed 
under a “private signature”, seven sales took place outside of New Orleans, and 12 sales were witnessed 
by court officials.  Finally, an unknown number of sales records were recorded by the public notary 
Carlilie Pollock and lost due to a missing volume in the Notarial Archives.  After these adjustments, we 
estimate a maximum of 1071 matches are possible for the slaves sold in 1830. 
  We match sales records using (1) the date of the previous transaction, (2) notary’s name, (3) 
buyer’s and seller’s names, (4) the slave’s name, (5) gender, (6) skin color, and (7) age (plus or minus one 
year).  The initial procedure results in 951 matches – however, some of these matches represent 
duplicates.  Some large transactions listed more than one slave with the same name, age, and skin color, 
resulting in non unique matches.  After removing these duplicates, our sample includes the records of 
833 paired sales.  Compared with the maximum number of possible matches, our match rate is at least 
77.8 percent. 
Buybacks 
  We define buybacks as sequential sales where the buyer resells or returns the slave to the 
original owner.  Such buybacks were common in New Orleans.
8  Of the 833 paired transactions in our 
sample, we find that 52 pairs (or more than 6 percent) represent transactions where buyers returned 
slaves to the original owners.  The buyer, as the previous owner of the slave, would have been fully 
informed of the slave’s unobservable characteristics and consequently, there is no asymmetry of 
information.  Including buybacks in our sample reduces the probability of finding adverse selection 
because prices would fully reflect the slave’s known characteristics and the seller had no incentive to 
adversely select his slave for resale. 
  Buybacks have broader implications regarding the presence of adverse selection in the market 
for slaves.  In many cases, the buyer’s motive for returning the slave (or selling him back) to the original 
                                                            
8 Because they required a title transfer, buybacks had to be notarized.  Consequently, the notarial records provide 
evidence of the number of slaves returned by buyers.   9 
 
owner was due to a possible violation of the implied warranty.  Under Louisiana law, sellers were 
required to disclose any vices or maladies suffered by the slaves at the time of sale.  If a dissatisfied 
buyer could prove that the slave’s undisclosed condition preexisted the sale date, he could sue to 
rescind the sale or demand compensation (Schafer 1987: pp. 307 308).  By protecting the buyer from 
false claims by the seller, an effective warranty tends to mitigate the effect of adverse selection.  Under 
such circumstances, sellers would not make false claims for fear of being sued and prices would reflect 
the unobserved characteristics of the slaves.  Buybacks indicate an effective warranty, reducing the 
incidence of adverse selection among all slaves sold in New Orleans.   
Price Changes for Sequential Sales 
  We need accurate prices in order to estimate price changes for sequential sales.  Unfortunately, 
many of the more unusual (and interesting) transactions fail to provide useful price data and are 
excluded from the sample.  For example, we excluded the records of donations or gifts of slaves, some 
of which occurred between family members.  Sometimes prices were omitted from these records, and 
because many were not arms length transactions, the prices may not be accurate.  The joint sale of 
slaves and other property or sales with special covenants were also excluded.
9   Because prices were 
often missing in barter transactions, these records were also removed.
10  As discussed previously, we 
excluded the records of buybacks because buyers, as previous owners of the slaves, were fully informed 
of the slave’s characteristics.  Finally, some slaves were sold in groups or lots without individual price 
information. We removed the records of these slaves from our sample.   After making these exclusions, 
our working sample includes 578 paired transactions.   
                                                            
9 When James Augustin Lee sold Bill, Hezekiah, and George, he included three horses, three carts, four mules, and 
their harnesses in the purchase price (Seghers, vol. 3, p. 163).   George Baumgard, in an example of a sale with 
special covenant, sold his bakery, including 15 slaves, to Paul Dardennes Poincy, with the restriction that Baumgard 
not compete against the new owner (by baking bread) for the next 5 years (Pollock, vol. 33, p. 387). 
10 Examples of slaves exchanged for property include the slave trader Joseph Meek, Jr., who traded one of his 
slaves for an American piano (O. de Armas, vol. 6, p. 209). In exchange for his slave, Pierre Marnett was promised 
26 “bulks” of buffalo meat, to be delivered via flatboat (Caire, vol. 12, p. 329).   10 
 
  We adjust all prices to reflect their real, present value equivalents.  Because they include the 
opportunity cost of the borrowed funds, the prices for credit sales may be inflated.   Instead of the 
prices quoted for these sales, we substitute the present value of the payment stream discounted at the 
prevailing market interest rate of 10 percent per annum.
11  We also deflate nominal prices for changes 
in the general level of slave prices.  Following Engerman, we construct an index using the average price 
for males without skills, aged 18 to 30 years, fully guaranteed as without physical or other infirmity 
(Ransom and Sutch, 1988, p. 156).  As seen in figure 2, we observe a slight upward trend in prices during 
the calendar year 1830    prices are approximately 5 percent higher in December than in January.   
Seasonality is also evident as prices decrease during the summer months when health conditions 
worsened and business activity declined in the city (Pritchett and Tunali, 1995).  For each pair of 
transactions, we divide the initial and final prices by the monthly index and the difference is expressed 
as a percentage of the initial price.    
  The mean percentage change in price between the initial purchase and resale is presented in 
Table 1.  As discussed previously, if buyers acquire more information regarding the unobserved 
characteristics of their slaves over time, they will resale their lower quality ‘lemons’ and retain the 
higher quality ‘peaches.’  Because potential buyers anticipate that slaves offered for resale are of lower 
overall quality, they bid lower prices for them.  Consequently, we predict a decrease in prices if the 
resold slaves were adversely selected by their owners.  As seen in Table 1, prices increased on average 
by 3.3 percent between the initial purchase and resale, which is contrary to the prediction.  In addition, 
the mean price change is statistically greater than zero at the 0.1 percent level of significance.  After 
removing outliers, the 90 percent trimmed mean equals 4.5 percent, which is also contrary to the 
prediction.  Of course, the prices of some slaves decreased whereas other increased.  Overall, 
                                                            
11 Most invoices do not quote an explicit market interest rate for credit sales.  Among those with a quoted rate, 76 
percent specify an annual rate of 10 percent.   11 
 
approximately 60 percent of the slaves sold for higher prices, suggesting that the value of most slaves 
increased when resold. 
Slave Traders 
  Slave traders played a major role in the New Orleans market, as both sellers and buyers of 
slaves.  In 1830, a majority of the slaves sold in New Orleans were imported from outside of the state, 
and interregional slave traders imported most of them.
12  The local traders functioned as intermediaries 
between sellers and buyers and speculated on price changes.  Traders turned over their inventory 
relatively rapidly which limited their knowledge of the slaves’ unobservable characteristics.  Experts in 
the buying and selling of slaves, traders are differentiated from other market participants in order to 
estimate the amount of adverse selection in this market. 
  Professional traders made their living from the buying and selling of slaves.  Identifying which of 
the market participants were traders, however, is problematic at best.  Searching the secondary 
literature on the slave trade for the names of traders is unsatisfactory for the simple reason that many 
traders are not identified.
13  In the following, we use the frequency of market participation to identify 
professional slave traders.  Specifically, we define a trader as anyone who sells 10 or more slaves in a 
single transaction or makes 10 or more slave sales.  Using this definition, we identify 66 sellers as slave 
traders (a list of the traders is found in the appendix).  We use different definitions of slave traders in 
order to check the sensitivity of our empirical results.  We find that the qualitative results are not 
affected by using these different definitions.   
                                                            
12 A comparison on the number of sellers of imported slaves with the number of different previous owners of the 
imported slaves, as listed on the certificates of good character, indicates approximately nine different owners for 
every seller of imported slaves in New Orleans.  This evidence suggests that interregional traders were purchasing 
slaves in the exporting areas and reselling them in New Orleans.  For information regarding the number of slaves 
originating from the exporting areas, see Freudenberger and Pritchett (1991).  
13 For example, James Barnes Diggs, one of the largest traders in New Orleans, is not identified in the secondary 
literature.  Indeed, his descendents and genealogists were unaware of Diggs’s occupation until recently. 12 
 
  Professional slave traders sold many more slaves than other sellers in New Orleans.  Although 
only 6 percent of the sellers are identified as traders, they sold 61 percent of the slaves.  What accounts 
for the large number of slaves sold by traders?  On average, traders sold more than twice as many slaves 
per transaction than other sellers (3 slaves per transaction for traders versus 1.4 slaves per transaction 
for other sellers).  More significantly, traders were, on average, much more active in the market than 
other sellers.  Traders averaged more than 19 transactions during the 1830 calendar year, compared to 
an average of only 1.7 transactions for other sellers.  Although slave traders were relatively few in 
number, they supplied the majority of slaves sold in New Orleans. 
  In addition to selling, traders purchased a large number of slaves sold in New Orleans.  
Interestingly, the traders were much more likely to resale their slaves than other buyers.  In New 
Orleans during 1830, traders bought 1157 slaves and resold 609 of them, or approximately 53 percent of 
their total purchases.
14  In contrast, non traders retained more than 95 percent of the slaves that they 
purchased.  Most sequential sales in our sample can be characterized by slave traders purchasing and 
reselling slaves within the city.  Of the 833 sequential sales identified in our sample, slave traders 
account for 73 percent of them.   Because slave traders account for most sequential sales in our sample, 
it is important that we understand their market behavior.   
  If we restrict our attention to those buyers who resold slaves during 1830, we find that slave 
traders resold their slaves much faster than other buyers.  For traders, the median length of time 
between purchase and resale was only 7 days whereas for other buyers the median length between 
purchase and resale was 43 days.  In addition, most slaves purchased by traders were imported.   Almost 
90 percent of the slaves purchased by traders were imported whereas only 33 percent of the slaves 
purchased by other buyers were imported.   Finally, traders purchased most of their slaves from other 
                                                            
14 One, of course, might wonder why slave traders did not resale all of the slaves that they purchased.  Indeed, 
some may have been sold after December 31, 1830, the last day in our sample period.  Alternatively, some traders 
transported their slaves outside of New Orleans for resale.  In both cases, such sales would be censored and not 
included in our matched sample. 13 
 
traders (rather than local sellers).  Almost 80 percent of the slaves purchased by traders were sold by 
other traders whereas local buyers purchased only 26 percent of their slaves from traders.   
  In summary, these descriptive statistics suggest the following:  many of the slaves purchased 
and resold by slave traders represent intermediate or wholesale transactions rather than final 
transactions.  Instead of residing in New Orleans during the selling season, some interregional traders 
sold their slaves to other traders, who in turn retailed them to local buyers.  It was not because traders 
gained additional information about the slaves that they decided to resell them.  In other words, these 
resold slaves were not adversely selected by the traders.  
  Slave traders behaved differently than other market participants, purchasing slaves with the 
intent of reselling them.  Because most slaves in our sample of sequential sales were purchased by 
traders, the sample means might mask the adverse selection practiced by other market participants.  In 
addition, the slave’s origin might be correlated with the information available to buyers at the time of 
initial purchase. New Orleans buyers had no prior knowledge of recently imported slaves whereas 
buyers might be informed of the unobservable characteristics of the local slaves.  In other words, the 
probability of finding adverse selection should be greatest for the imported slaves for whom buyers 
were uninformed.  In the following, we discern the trading status of buyers and the import status of the 
slaves sold in New Orleans.  Specifically, we predict that adverse selection should be most evident 
among the imported slaves purchased by non traders.  As seen in Table 1, however, instead of observing 
a decrease in market prices for those slaves, we find that the prices of imported slaves purchased by 
non traders increased on average between initial purchase and resale in New Orleans.  In addition, the 
mean percentage change in the prices of these slaves is not statistically different from the mean 
percentage price change for imported slaves purchased by traders, or for that matter, the local slaves 
purchased by non traders.  Only the local slaves purchased by traders experienced a price decrease – 
however, the average percentage change in price was less than 2 percent and not statistically different 14 
 
from zero.
15   Finally, assume that absent adverse selection, slave prices would have increased at the 
same rate as those of imported slaves purchased by traders.  We deem this group to be an appropriate 
counterfactual because, as discuss previously, traders did not adversely select their slaves for resale.  
Compared with this control group, the prices of imported slaves purchased by non traders decreased by 
less than 1 percent.  In addition, the difference in the means is not statistically different from zero.  In 
summary, these simple descriptive statistics suggest that adverse selection, if present in the New 
Orleans market, had a relatively small effect on the prices of slaves. 
Regression analysis 
  Our matched data set enables us to estimate a fixed effect model for the change in slave prices.  
Because we observe sequential sales for the same slave, his unobserved characteristics are the same for 
both transactions.  Consequently, prices changes can be attribution to the owner’s discovery of new 
information and the adverse selection of the lower quality slaves for sale.  We need, however, to allow 
for the possibility that the characteristics of the slaves may have changed between the date of initial 
purchase and final sale.
16  In fact, the prices of some slaves may move in a predictable fashion 
depending on the slave’s observable characteristics.  For example, a younger slave might increase in 
value as he ages whereas an older adult might become less valuable.  In the following, we adjust for 
these predictable changes when comparing the initial and final transaction prices.  In addition, the 
slave’s characteristics may have been affected by his tenure in New Orleans.  For example, “acclimation” 
to the Louisiana disease environment may have increased the value of some slaves.  In New Orleans, the 
greatest threat to new arrivals was yellow fever, which appeared on a regular basis during each summer.  
We account for the slave’s exposure to yellow fever by controlling for his presence in New Orleans 
during the summer months. 
                                                            
15 The decrease in the price of local slaves purchased by traders is a puzzle.  After all, local speculators would 
bankrupt if they consistently lost money on their purchases.   
16 Because our sample is limited to sales for the 1830 calendar year, the owner’s duration of ownership for these 
sequential sales was less than one year. 15 
 
  The percentage change in the slave’s price is estimated using OLS and the regression results are 
presented in Table 2.  In addition to covariates indicating the trading status of the buyer and the origin 
of the slave, the regression includes covariates for the slave’s individual characteristics at the time of 
initial sale in New Orleans.  As indicated by the regression coefficient, prices of male slaves fell 
approximately 3.6 percent between initial purchase and resale.  The prices for older slaves increased 
faster than those for younger slaves, with the maximum predicted price increase occurring at 31 years of 
age.  Interestingly, prices for skilled slaves increased by more than 25 percent between purchase and 
resale.  Potential buyers might have acquired more information regarding the slave’s skill after 
observing him in New Orleans, thus accounting for the higher resell price.   Acclimation to New Orleans 
had little effect on slave prices as indicated by the estimated regression coefficient for the summer 
residence of the slave.  Finally, new owners learned more about the slave’s unobservable characteristics 
with the passage of time.  Consequently, the duration of ownership should have increased the 
probability of adverse selection and decreased the resale price of the slave.  As seen by the estimated 
regression coefficient, the number of days elapsed between sale and resale had little effect on the 
percentage price change.   
  The mean percentage price change, conditional on the slave’s individual characteristics, is 
presented in Table 3.  We evaluate the effect of individual characteristics at the sample means for the 
independent variables.  The predicted average percentage change in price is once again positive for the 
imported slave purchased by non traders.  After controlling for the slave’s observable characteristics, 
the prices for slaves purchased by non traders increased faster than the prices for those slaves 
purchased by traders.  This result is contrary to our earlier predictions, that adverse selection would 
have decreased the average resale price for slaves sold in New Orleans. 
Discussion and Conclusion  16 
 
  In this paper, we exploit perceived differences in the knowledge of buyers to estimate the 
extent of adverse selection in the slave market.  In this regard, our paper has much in common with the 
recent paper by Dionne, St Amour, and Vencatachellum (2009).  Because imported slaves were newly 
introduced to the state, all New Orleans buyers would have been ignorant of the slaves’ unobservable 
characteristics.  In time, the new owners would have learned more about their slaves hidden 
characteristics, which in turn would have affected their perceived value of the slaves.  Owners practiced 
adverse selection when they resold slaves with hidden defects while retaining those without them.
17  If 
buyers anticipated that the slaves were adversely selected for sale (and subject to hidden defects), they 
would have reduced their bids for them.  Consequently, if owners adversely selected slaves for sale (and 
buyers recognized this), we should observe lower prices for those slaves who were resold in New 
Orleans. 
  Our predictions are similar to those made by Greenwald and Glasspiegel (1983) although the 
mechanism by which sellers adversely selected their slaves is somewhat different.  According to 
Greenwald and Glasspiegel, local planters retained all but their worse slaves because of the region’s 
high labor productivity whereas planters from the Old South were willing to sell nearly all of their slaves.  
If New Orleans buyers anticipated that the local slaves were adversely selected for sale, they would have 
lowered their bids for them.  Consequently, Greenwald and Glasspiegel test for adverse selection by 
comparing the prices of local and imported slaves.  In our paper, we improve their original test in two 
ways. First, the Fogel and Engerman sample (1976) used by Greenwald and Glasspiegel is subject to 
measurement error with respect to the slaves’ origins.  For most years, notaries were not required to 
record the origins of the slaves sold in New Orleans and in fact, most did not do so.  As a consequence, 
nearly two thirds of the observations in Fogel and Engerman’s sample have missing values for the slave’s 
region of origin.  Because of the 1829 Louisiana law that required imported slaves be accompanied by a 
                                                            
17 Resale was quite common in this market. Recall that over half (54 percent) of the local slaves sold in New 
Orleans had been previously sold within eight months. 17 
 
so called certificate of “good moral character,” the Hayes and Smith sample includes accurate 
information regarding the origin of slaves sold in New Orleans.  Consequently, our estimates are not 
biased by potential measurement error.  Secondly, the imported slaves sold in New Orleans may be 
subject to other forms of selection bias.  According to Alchian and Allen’s theory, a fixed transport cost 
applied to two goods of differing quality lowers the relative price of the higher quality good in the 
destination market.  Pritchett and Chamberlain (1993) use this theory to account for the higher prices of 
imported slaves sold in New Orleans.  For our sample of sequential sales, we observe the prices of the 
same slave twice:  once when he was initially introduced into the state and a second time when his 
status changed to that of a local slave.  Other than this change in status, the characteristics of the slave 
should have remained unchanged.
18  Consequently, by comparing the initial and resale prices, we 
control for other forms of unobserved heterogeneity such as those resulting from other forms of 
selection bias (such as transportation costs).  
  In this paper, we perform a relatively simple experiment.  We compare the prices of slaves for 
whom all buyers were uninformed with their subsequent resale prices.  We propose that if the initial 
buyers adversely selected their slaves for resale, the subsequent resale price should be less than the 
original price.  Using sequential price data from the New Orleans slave market, we find the opposite –
the resale price of slaves actually increased.  From this result, we conclude that adverse selection, if 
present in the New Orleans market, had a relatively small effect on the prices of slaves. 
                                                            
18 Using regression analysis, we control for possible changes in the slave’s characteristics resulting from his tenure 




Percentage change in price between initial purchase and subsequent resale 
Matched records for slaves sold in New Orleans during 1830 
Sample  N 
Mean percentage  
change in price 
Trimmed mean percentage 
change in price 
All slaves  568  3.3*  4.5* 
Imported slaves, purchased by  
non traders 
35  3.1  7.8* 
Imported slaves, purchased by 
traders 
399  3.7*  5.0* 
Local slaves, purchased by  
non traders 
94  3.7  3.9* 
Local slaves, purchased by  
traders 
40   1.8   2.6 
Source:  New Orleans Notarial Archives. 
Note:  Standard deviations in parentheses.  * Mean percentage change is statistically different from zero 




OLS Regression Analysis:  Percentage price change for sequential sales 





Mean &  
Std. Dev. 
  Intercept   0.154* 
(0.068) 
1.000


















































  Adjusted R
2  0.035  
  Number of observations  568  568 
Source:  New Orleans Notarial Archives. 
Note:  The dependent variable is the percentage change in price.  The omitted variable refers to 
local slaves purchased by non traders.  Skilled slaves the occupations blacksmith, bricklayer, 
carpenter, caulker, cooper, plasterer, mechanic, tinsmith, mason, shoemaker, butcher, and 
painter.  New Orleans summer residence refers to slaves initially sold prior to July and resold 
after September.   Standard errors are listed in parentheses.   





Predicted Percentage change in price between initial purchase and subsequent resale 
Matched records for slaves sold in New Orleans during 1830 
Sample  N 
Average percentage  
change in price 
Diff in Diff: 
non traders – traders 
Imported slaves, purchased by  
non traders 
35  0.049 
0.015 
Imported slaves, purchased by 
traders 
399  0.034 
Local slaves, purchased by  
non traders 
94  0.043 
0.055 
Local slaves, purchased by  
traders 
40   0.012 




Figure 1    Frequency of resale for New Orleans slaves 
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Appendix:  Names of identified slave traders 
Last Name  First Name 
Alexander  Thornton 
Bacon  Langston Parke 
Bauduc  Joseph Theodore 
Baumgard  George 
Beasley  Richard Renard 
Benthall  Robert 
Bishop  William 
Boudar  Thomas 
Boyce  Robert 
Carter  John Rigger 
Chabert  Leon 
Cooper  Richard 
Coote  Thomas 
Cotton  William 
Cox  James 
Davis  George 
Diggs  James Barnes 
Dudley  Frederick James 
Eaton  Benjamin C. 
Foxwell  Stephen 
Franklin  Isaac 
Franklin  James Rawlings 
Grigsby  Lewis Kemp 
Grimes  William Garland 
Harris  Samuel Shelton 
Hatcher  Charles Francis 
Heath  Williamson Bonner 
Huie  James 
Huie  Josiah 
Huie  Robert 
Johnson  Henry 
Johnson  John Brown 
Jones  John 
Jones  Thomas Martin 
Kelly  William Frohock 
Kenner  Henry Bollinger 25 
 
Legrand  Edwin Osborn 
Ligon  Seth Ward 
Lund  Oliver 
Maydwell  John 
Meek, Jr.  Jesse 
Meek, Jr.  Joseph 
Mercer  William D. 
Nash  William Junius 
Payne  Moses 
Peillon  Stephen 
Phillippi  Giovanni Baptiste 
Pierce  Granville Sharpe 
Priddy  William 
Puryear  Alexander Bannister 
Reynolds  Samuel 
Robinson  Abner 
Simington  Robert Webb 
Small  Thomas Boniface 
Swann  William 
Tate  Garland 
Tigner  George Washington 
Townsend  Clement 
Turner  Josiah 
Webb  John Vivian 
Wilkinson  James Park 
Williamson  John Breedlove 
Woolfolk  Austin 
Woolfolk  John 
Woolfolk  Joseph Biggers 
Wright  Robert Austin 
 